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56 JONES V. SUPERIOR COURT [58 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 7393. In Bank. June 27, 1962.] 
NEAL CHESTER JONES, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR 
COURT OF NEVADA COUNTY et al., Respondents. 
[1] Discovery-Purpose.-Discovery is designed to ascertain the 
truth in criminal as well as in civil cases. 
[2] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Discovery and Inspection. 
-Absent some governmental requirement that information be 
kept confidential for the purposes of effective law enforce-
ment, the State has no interest in denying the accused access 
to all evidence that can throw light on issues in the case, and 
in particular it has no interest in convicting on the testimony 
of witnesses who have not been as rigorously cross-examined 
and as thoroughly impeached as the evidence permits. To deny 
flatly any right of production on the ground that an imbalance 
would be created between the advantages of prosecution and 
defense would be to lose sight of the true purpose of a criminal 
trial, the ascertainment of the facts. 
[3] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery and lnspection.-Absent 
the privilege against self-crimination or other privileges pro-
vided by law, defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest 
in denying the prosecution access to evidence that can throw 
light on issues in the case. 
[4] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery a.nd lnspection.-Whether 
the accused or the prosecution is seeking access to evidence 
that can throw light on issues in the case, it is not less appro-
priate in one instance than in the other for the courts to 
develop the rules governing discovery in the absence of express 
legislation authorizing such discovery. 
[5] ld.-Rights of Accused-Discovery and lnspection.-Pretrial 
discovery in favor of defendants in criminal cases is not re-
quired by due process. When the Supreme Court permits dis-
covery in advance of as well as at the trial, it is not acting 
under constitutional compulsion but to promote the orderly 
ascertainment of the truth; that procedure should not be a 
one-way street. 
[6] Witnesses - Self-crimination - Production of Papers.-Under 
the rule that a defendant in a criminal case may not be com-
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Discovery, Inspection, Mental and Physical 
Examination, § 4 et seq.; Am.Jur., Discovery and Inspection, § 9 
et seq. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Discovery, § 1; [2-5] Criminal Law, 
§ 104.5; [6, 7] Witnesses, § 22; [8] Witnesses, § 76(1); [9] Wit-
. nesses, §§ 22, 76(1). 
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pelled to testify (Pen. Code, § 1323.5), he may not ordinarily 
be required to produce private documents in his possession. 
[7] ld.-Self-crimination-Production of Papers.-Unlike an ordi-
nary witness, a defendant need make no showing that the 
answer or document sought may be criminating, since the very 
fact that the prosecution seeks it establishes that in the 
prosecution's view it may be criminating. 
[8] ld.-Privileged Communications-Attorney and Client.-Inso-
far as the prosecution seeks reports made or to be made by 
physicians to whom the accused was sent by his attorney for 
examination, as distinguished from advice and treatment, it 
would violate the attorney-client privilege, since such reports 
are communications from the accused to his attorneys through 
such physicians. 
[9] Id.-Self-crimination-Production of Papers: Privileged Com-
munications-Attorney and Client.-The prosecution is entitled 
to discover the names of witnesses the accused intends to call 
and any reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence 
in support of his particular defense of impotence, and insofar 
as an order of the trial court requires the accused to reveal 
the names and addresses of such witnesses and to produce such 
reports and X-rays, it does not violate the privilege against 
self-crimination or the attorney-client privilege. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of Nevada County and Vernon Stoll, Judge thereof, 
from enforcing an order requiring petitioner to produce medi-
cal reports and other documentary material in a rape prosecu-
tion. Writ granted. 
C. E. Tindall and Kern E.Tindali for Petitioner. 
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier, Assistant 
Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Attorney General, 
Harold A. Berliner, District Attorney (Nevada), and Harold 
F. Wolters, Deputy Distict Attorney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On October 30, 1961, the day set for his 
trial on the cllarge of rape, petitioner filed a motion for con-
tinuance and an affidavit in which he alleged that he was and 
for a long time had been impotent and that he needed time 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 19 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses, 
131. 
[8] See Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 55 et seq.; Am.Jur., Witnesses, 
1460 et seq. 
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to gather medical eyjdence including medical reports in con-
nection with injuries IlC sufferell in 1053 aud 1054. The motion 
was granted. Oul'\ovember 3 the dititrict attorney filed a 
motiollfor discoverY,requestiug petitioner and his attorney 
to make available to theprosecu tiOll: (1) the names and 
addresses of any and all physicians and surgeons subpoenaed 
to testify on behalf of petitioner with respect to certain in-
juries suffered by him in 1953 and 1954 and bearing on the 
(1Uestion of whether or not petitioner is impotent; (2) the 
llames and addresses of all physicians who have treated peti-
tioner prior to the trial; (3) all reports of doctors or other 
reports pertainillg to the physical condition of petitioner relat-
ing to said injuries and bearing on the qnestion whether 
petitioner is impotent; and (4) all X-rays of petitioner taken 
immediately following the 1953 and 1954 injuries. The court 
gmnted the motion over p"titioncr's objection. Petitioner seeks 
a writ of prohibition to restrain enforcement of the trial 
court's order. 
[1] Discovery is designed to ascertain the truth (see 
Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Ca1.2d 355, 375-377 
[15 Cal.Rptr. 90, 364 P.2d 266]) in criminal as well as in 
civil cases. (People v. Estrada, 54 Ca1.2d 713, 716 [7 Cal.Rptr. 
897,355 P.2d641]; People v. Cooper, 53 Ca1.2d 755, 768-771 
[3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964] ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 
Ca1.2d 72, 74-76 [346 P.2d 407]; Funk v. Superior Court, 
52 Cal.2d 423, 424-425 [340 P.2J 593]; People v. Durazo, 
52 Ca1.2d 354,356 [340 P.2d 504] ; People v. Chapman, 52 Cal. 
2d 95, 98-99 [338 P.2J 428] ; People v. Ca1·tic1·, 51 Ca1.2d 590, 
594 [335 P.2d 114] ; People v. Wmiams, 51 Ca1.2d 355, 357-
359 [333 P.2d 19J ; Tupper v. Superior Court, 51 Ca1.2d 263, 
265 [331 P.2d 977] ; Vance v. Superior Cvurt, 51 Ca1.2d 92, 
93 [330 P.2d 773] ; Mitchell v. Superior COllrt, 50 Ca1.2d 827, 
829 [330 P.2d 48] ; Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Ca1.2d 812, 
819 [330 P.2d 39] ; People v. McShann, 50 Ca1.2d 802, 806-808 
[330 P.2d 33] ; People v. Carter, 48 Ca1.2J 737, 752-753 [312 
P.2d 665] ; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704, 706-709 
[312 P.2d 898] ; People v. Riser, 47 Ca1.2d 566, 585-588 [305 
P.2d 1J.) In People v. Riser, supra, pages 585-586, we noted 
that "Originally at common law the accused in a criminal 
action could not compel production of documentq or other 
evidence in the possession of the prosecution. [Citations.] 
Production was denied before trial on the ground that to 
('ompel the prosecution to reveal its evidence beforehand 
would enable the defendant to secure perjured testimony and 
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fabricated evidence to meet the state's case. It was felt, 
furthermore, that to allow the d<'fendallt to compel production 
when the prosecntion could not ill its turn compel production 
from the defendant because of the privilege against self in-
crimination would unuuly shift to the defendant's side a 
balance of advantages already heavily weighted in his favor. 
[Citations.] . .. [2] Absent some governmental require-
ment that information be kept confidential for the purposes 
of effective law enforcement, the state has no interest in deny-
ing the accused access to all evidence that can throw light on 
issues iu the case, and in particular it has no interest ill con-
victing on the testimony of witnesses who have 110t been as 
rigorously cross-examined and as thoroughly impeached as the 
evidence permits. To deny fiatly any right of production Oll 
the ground that an imbalance would be created between the 
advantages of prosecution and defense would be to lose sight 
of the true purpose of a criminal trial, the aseertaillment of 
the facts. [Citations.] " [3] Similarly, absent the privilege 
against self-crimination or other privileges proyided by law, 
the defendant in a criminal case has no valid interest in deny-
ing the prosecution access to evidence that can throw light 011 
issues in the case. [ 4] Nor is it any less appropriate in one 
case than in the othcr for the courts to develop the rules 
governing discovery in the absence of express legislation 
authorizing such discovery. 
It is contended, however, that the eases permitting discovery 
by defendants are not based on the power of the court to 
develop rules of procedure but on the constitutional mandate 
that defendants be given fair trials, and that since there is no 
constitutional mandate to extend discovery to the prosecution, 
the court should not do so in the absence of enabling legisla-
tion. There might be merit in these contentions had defend-
ants been permitted discovery only when necessary to insure 
due process of law. [5] Pretrial discovery in favor of de-
fendants, however, is not required by due process. (See 18 
U.S.C. § 3500; Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 349 
[79 8.Ct. 1217, 3'L.Ed.2d 1287] ; Campbell v. United States, 
365 U.S. 85, 86 [81 8.Ct. 421, 5 L.Ed.2d 428] ; People v. Riser, 
47 CaL2d 566,585 [305 P.2d 1) ; Louisell, Cdminal Discovery: 
Dilemma Real or Apparcnt1, 49 CaLL.Rev. 56, 73-74.) Accord-
ingly, when this court permitted discovery in advance of as 
well as at the trial (Powell v. S1lperior Court, 48 Ca1.2d 704 
[312 P.2d 698) ; Funk v. Sllperior Court, 52 Ca1.2d 423 [340 
P.2d 593] ; Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72 [346 P.2d 
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407] ), it was not acting under constitutional compulsion but 
to promote the orderly ascertainment of the truth. That pro-
cedure should not be a one-way street. (People v. Cooper, 53 
Cal.2d 755, 771 [3 Cal.Rptr. 148, 349 P.2d 964); Powell v. 
Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707 [312 P.211 698].) 
Petitioner contends, however, that the discovery order in 
this case violates the privilege against self-crimination (Cal. 
Const., art. I, § 13; Pen. Code, §§ 688, 1323, 1323.5) and the 
attorney-client privilege. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1881, subd. 2.) 
[ 6] It is settled that a defendant in a criminal case may not 
be compelled to testify (Pen. Code, § 1323.5), and it has gen-
erally been held that he may not be required to produce pri-
vate documents in his possession. (People v. Royce, 106 Cal. 
173, 184-185 [37 P. 630, 39 P. 524) ; People v. Jackson, 2-1: 
Cal.App.2d 182, 198 f74 P.2d 1085] ; People V. Rubens, 11 
Cal.App.2d 576, 585 (54 P.2d 98, 1107] ; 8 Wigmore on Evi-
dence [McNaughton rev. 1961] § 2263, pp. 379-380.) [7] Un-
like an ordinary witness, a defendant need make no showing 
that the answer or document sought may be incriminating 
(People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App.2d 650, 666-667 [245 P.2d 633], 
and cas~s cited), for the very fact that the prosecution seeks 
it, establishes that in the prosecution's view it may be incrimi-
nating. (See 8 Wigmore on Evidence [McNaughton rev. 1961] 
§ 2260, p. 369.) When the prosecution has ample evidence of 
the existence, identity, and authenticity of documents in the 
defendant's possession and thus does not need to rely on his 
knowledge to locate and to identify them or on his testimony 
to authenticate them, it may be that his implied admission 
alone that the documents produced were those he was ordered 
to produce would involve too trivial a degree of incrimination 
to justify invoking the privilege. (See Maguire, Evidence of 
Guilt, pp. 22-23; Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran 
Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 18 U.Chi. 
L.Rev. 687, 699-701.) We are not confronted with such a 
case, however, for the prosecution has no independent evidence 
of the existence of the reports and X-rays it seeks or the names 
of the witnesses who have treated or will examine petitioner 
and who could authenticate any reports or X-rays they have 
made or will make. The prosecution seeks more than to require 
petitioner tacitly to admit that the materials are those re-
quested; it seeks the benefit of his knowledge of the existence 
of possible witnesses and the existence of possible reports and 
i X-rays for the purpose of preparing its case against him. 
[8] Moreover, insofar as the prosecution seeks reports 
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made or to be made by physicians to whom petitioner "was 
sent by his attorney for examination, as distinguished from 
advice and treatment," it would violate the attorney-client 
privilege, for such reports are communications from petitioner 
to his attorneys through such physieians. (San Frallcisco Uni-
fied School Dist. v. Superior Court, 5;) Ca1.2d 451, 455 [11 Cal. 
Rptr. 373, 3;)9 P.2d 925] ; City & County of San Francisco v. 
Superior Court, 37 Ca1.2d 227, 236-238 [231 P.2d 26,25 
A.L.R.2d 1418J.) 
[9] The prosecution, however, is entitled to discover the 
names of the witnesses petitioner intends to call and any 
reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in evidence in 
support of his particular affirmative defense of impotence. A 
number of states have statutes permitting or requiring discov-
ery in criminal cases of the identity of witnesses who are to 
be called to testify for a defendant in connection with a par-
ticular defense, such as an alibi. (Sec Louisell, Criminal Dis-
covery: Dilemma Real or Apparent r, 49 Cal.L.Rev. 56, 61, n. 
13; 6 Wigmore on Evidence [3d ed.] § 1855 (b), pp. 418-420; 
30 A.L.R.2d 480.) Although such discovery may require a 
defendant to disclose information that would lead to effective 
rebuttal of his defense, these statutes have uniformly been 
upheld against the claim that they violate the privilege against 
self-crimination. (State v. Smetana, 131 Ohio St. 329 (2 N.E.2d 
778] ; State v. Thayer, 124 Ohio St. 1, 4 [176 N.E. 656, 75 
A.L.R. 48]; People v. Sh1tlenberg, 279 App.Div. 1115 {112 
N.Y.S.2d 374, 375] ; People v. Rakicc, 260 App.Div. 452 123 
N.Y.S.2d 607, 612-613] ; People v. Schade, 161 Misc. 212 [292 
N.Y.S. 612, 615-619] ; State v. Kopacka, 261 Wis. 70, 75-76 [51 
N.W.2d 495,30 A.L.R.2d 476].) The identity of the defense 
witnesses and the existence of any reports or X-rays the de-
fense offers in evidence will nccessarily be revealed at the 
trial. The witnesses will be subject to cross-examination, and 
the reports and X-rays subject to study and challenge. Learn. 
ing the identity of the defense witnesses and of such reports 
and X-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution to per-
form its function at the trial more effectively. Thus," the alibi 
statutes do not infringe on Hie privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Rather, they set up a wholly reasonable rule of plead-
ing which in no manner compels a defendant to give any evi-
dence other than that which he will voluntarily and without 
compulsion give at trial. Such statutes do .not violate the 
right of a defendant to be forever silent. Rather they say to 
the accused: If you don't intend to remain silent, if you 
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expect to offer an alibi defense, then advance notice and 
whereabouts must be forthcoming; but if you personally and 
your potential witnesses elect to remain silent throughout the 
trial, we have no desire to break that silence by any require-
ment of this statute." (Dean, Advance Specification of De-
fense in Oriminal Oases, 20 A.B.A.J. 435, 440.) 
Insofar as the trial court's order herein requires petitioner 
to reveal the names and addresses of witnesses he intends to 
call and to produce reports and X-rays he intends to introduce 
in evidence to support his defense of impotence, it does not 
violate the privilege against self-crimination. Nor to this extent 
does it violate the attorney.client privilege. It simply requires 
petitioner to disclose information that he will shortly reveal 
anyway. Such information is discoverable. The order, how-
ever, is not limited to the discovery of such information, and 
therefore cannot be enforced in its present form. 
Let a peremptory writ of prohibition issue restraining the 
trial court frOID proceeding in a manner inconsistent with the 
views expressed herein. 
Gibson, C. J., McComb, J., and White, J., concurred. 
PETERS, J., Concurring and Dissenting.-I agree with the 
majority opinion insofar as it holds that a "peremptory writ 
of prohibition issue restraining the trial court," but I dissent 
from the holding that the trial court may permit the prosecu-
tion "to discover the names of the witnesses petitioner intends 
to call and any reports and X-rays he intends to introduce in 
evidence in support of his particular affirmative defense of 
impotence." This last-quoted holding, in my opinion, violates 
the fundamental constitutional rights of defendant. 
The Constitution of California (art. I, § 13) provides that 
"No person shall ... be compelled, in any criminal case, to 
be a witness against himself; ... " but his failure to explain 
"the case against him" may be commented on by court and 
counsel. Section 688 of the Penal Code provides "No person 
ean be compelled, in a criminal action, to be a witness against 
Hmself; ... " Section 1323 of the Penal Code states the same 
thought in the following language: "A defendant in a crimi-
nal action or proceeding can not be compelled to be a witness 
against himself; . . ." Section 1323.5 provides that in all 
criminal proceedings "the person accused or charged shaH, at 
his own request, but not otherwise, be deemed a competent 
witness. " 
) 
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These guarantees are fundamental, unlimited, aud absolute. 
They are discussed at length in People v. Talle, 111 Cal.App. 
2d 650 [245 P.2d 633]. Until today these principles have never 
been challenged successfully. In that case it was stated that 
(p. 664): "under these constitutional and statutory provi-
sions the right of the defendant to remain silent is absolute 
except that the prosecution may comment if the defendant 
fails 'to explain or to deuyby his testimony any evidence or 
faets in the case against him.' Thus, by express constitutional 
and statutory limitation comment is allo\ved only when the 
prosecution has first made out a case that the accused can or 
should dellY. At the inceptiollof the case, obviously,the prose-
cution has developed no facts at all that the accused can deny. 
As was said in People v. Sawaya, 46 Cal.App.2d '.l66, 471 [115 
P.2d 1001] : 'The fact that the constitutional provision pro-
vides that in a criminal casC', whether or not the defendant 
testifies, his failure to explain or deny by his testimony any 
evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented 
upon by the court or counsel and may be considered by the 
court or the jury, does not deprive a defendant of his right 
to stand mute, nor docs it rclease the prosecution or the bur-
den of establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and 
by competent and legal evidence.' 
"Under a propcr interpretation of these quoted provisions, 
an accused has the right to stand mute, clothed in the pre-
sumption of innocence, until the prosecution, at the trial, has 
made out a prima facie case against him. Until that has been 
done, it is improper to even comment on his silence." Cases 
are cited holding that it is even improper to compel the de-
fendant to give his name or address, or to be compelled to 
assert before the jury his constitutional right to be silent. 
Reference is made to the case of United States v. Housing 
Foundation of America, 176 F.2d 665, written by Judge Good-
rich, who held (p. 666) that compelling a defendant to give 
evidence against himself "is so fundamental an error that the 
judgment must be reversed .... The error made arises from 
confusing the'privilege of any witness not to give incriminat-
ing answers with the right of the accused not to take the stand 
in a criminal prosecution against him."1 
Compelling the accused to give testimony prior to the estab-
lishment of a prima facie case against him is described in 
TaUs (p. 667) as a "flagrant, shocking and prejudicial inva-
. 1Thia same confusion is nppan'nt in the majority opinion. 
) 
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sion of appellant's constitutional rights," a description 
equally applicable to the instant case. At page 676, the court, 
after again pointing out that the accused has a "right to 
remain silent" until a prima facie case has been established 
against him, stated "Those accused of crime are not required 
to cooperate with the prosecution. The prosecution has the 
duty of proving that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable 
doubt, and until that is done, the accused may remain silent." 
The court pointed out that the argument that otherwise the 
guilty may go free is no justification for a violation of those 
constitutional rights. It used the following language directly 
applicable to the instant case (p. 678): "Prosecuting those 
accused of crime is often a tedious and tiresome process. 
But this is the process required by law, and short cuts cannot 
be tolerated. Constitutional guarantees are not arbitrary pro-
nouncements adopted to protect the guilty, and to make it 
difficult for sincere hardworking prosecutors. They are the 
result of hundreds of years of struggle in fighting govern-
mental oppression. They are necessary to protect the innocent. 
If an accused, even a guilty accused, cannot be convicted 
except by a violation of these principles, then he should not 
and cannot be lawfully convicted." 
These principles are fundamental. The majority seek . to 
escape their application by a series of false rationalizations 
and non sequiturs. They talk about the inherent fairness of 
compelling the defendant to divulge the names and reports 
of his witnesses, and state that such discovery procedures will 
aid "to ascertain the truth," and conclude that the violation 
of defendant's rights is not very serious because the requested 
information "will necessarily be revealed at the trial," and 
" [I] earning the identity of the defense witnesses and of such 
. reports and x-rays in advance merely enables the prosecution 
to perform its function at the trial more effectively." The 
majority point to the cases that permit the defendant pretrial 
discovery, and conclude that "when this court permitted dis-
. covery in advance of as well as at the trial [citations), it was 
not acting under constitutional compulsion but to promote the 
orderly ascertainment of the truth. That procedure should 
not be a one-way street." 
These rationalizations could be used to justify the Inquisition, 
: and the use of the rack and the screw. The "one-way street" 
, argument is obviously fallacious. The simple fact is that our 
: system of criminal procedure is founded upon the principle 
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the f'Ollstitlltio!l:tl :'ighl 0:' the dt'fellllunt, who is presul1,eu to 
be inllocent, to st,md l'ih'llt while the state attempts to meet 
its hlmlt'll ot' pl'oof, that is, to prove the defendant':; guilt 
beyond a rea:SQlIahlt, dou ut, Tfhl' tll'fl'nilant, up until )lOW, ilid 
not haw to take n naetive part ill the ascertainment of the 
fads. 'l'l!e majority opinion dol'S not m::-rdy enlarge a simple 
judicial principle of pretrial procedure, it fUlldamentally 
alters our concepts or the rig-Lt.; of the accused, and forces 
him to coltle fOny,lrd w;tl1 i;)formation before the prosecution 
lIas pres('nted a ease a~ainst him. 
The argnmellt that bl'c8.us(' this court granted discovery to 
the deren(lant, it r.hould grant it to the prosecution, fails to 
consider the l1atll~·t' of the defclltlant's right to pretrial dis-
coyery. ·WhiL! the ea.l'S estahlislling this right, rited by the 
majority, did hol(1 that snch right was not compelled hy the 
due proeess elaw;(.', tlll'Y al:-;o recognized and held that the 
defendant was t'lltitleJ to ~:uch discovery as part of the fair 
trial impliedly grant~'(! to him by artie1e I, section 13, of the 
state Constitutioa. MallY or the eases recognized (see parti<:u-
larly POlCell Y. Superior C'Iurl, 48 Ca1.2d 704, 706-707 [312 
P.2d 698] ; People v. R:'scl', 4j Ca1.2d 566, 586 [303 P.2d 1]) 
that to give tll(' defC'l!l1ant pretrial discovery mi[!'ht create au 
imbalanee between the }H'os<'eutioll and defense', but held that 
such imbalanee was inherent in our system of criminal pro-
cedure. ,\Vhilt.>, of course', a ('I'ill~itlal trial should be "fair" to 
the prosecution as well as to thc defense, it should not be 
forgotten that the defendant bas additional constitutional and 
statutory rights not giwn to the p,·os('cution. The right not to 
incriminate himself, ttH' right to remain absolutely mute ulltil 
a prima faeie case has vern established, the right to the pre-
sumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, are a few of thc.qc rights that completely refute 
the" one-way street" argument. 
The majority giye lip sCrYice to the existence of these rights 
and then ema'l('ulate th(,lll by holdillg that they (to not apply 
where the r~qu('st('d information refers to a so-raIled "affirma-
tive" defense. In other words the majority see no harm in 
judicially creatillg- a right in the prosecution to compel the 
defendant to dis(·lose the ll:lnit'3 of the witnesses he may intend 
to call and the X-I'a:--,., :Iud reports he may intend to introduce 
as long as these only relate to the affirmative defense that 
defendant disclosed 011 the motion for a continuance. The basis 
for this distinction apparrlltly is that the sought after material 
will not or perhaps ran not be used by the prosecution in 
sa C.2d~ 
) 
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{'stablishillg its prima facie case but only to rebut this possible 
affirmative defense. In other words, as I understand thema-
jority, they hold that the defendant's constitutional right to 
remain silent, and his constitutional privilege against self in- i 
~ri~dinatiolln, exhist 10nIY so llong as heffi does. notddfisclose, Iefvehn -.. 1 .. ' 
mCI enta y, t at Ie may lave an a rmahve e ense. e 
does so disclost', prior to trial,lle can be compelled to divulge. 
his evidence ill snpport of it. I suppose that, if 011 the motion l' 
·for a continuance, the defendant lIad averred that he needed I 
more time to look for witnesses that would testify a third 
person committed the offense, the majority would see no harm 
in compelling him to disclose, prior to trial, the names of the 
witnesses and the name of the third party. This, too, would 
he an "affirmative defense." In fact, any defense other than 
to attempt to refute the prosecution's witnesses, is an "affirma-
tive" defense. 
This type of Clreasoning" overlooks the possibility that the 
compelled revelation by the defendant that he may hav\! only 
a weak defense may itself be self-criminating. Until today, in 
California, a defendant could weigh his proposed defense 
against the prosecution's case, and not make up his mind until 
he heal'd the strength or weakness of the case against him 
,vhether he would rely on a straight not guilty defense or . 
urge an "affirmative" defense. Now he must make that· 
decision before the state's presentation. If the majority O}>in-
ion were sound, it ,vould mean logically that the prosecution 
could serve interrogatories upon a defendant demanding to 
know whether or not he intends to rely 011 an "affirmative" 
defense, what it is, and what evidence he has to support it. 
I am not willing to see fundamental constitutional rights emas-
culated in this fashion. 
This claimed distinction behveen a defense and an affirma-
tive defense is a spurious oue. Trial courts are neither omnipo-
tent nor omniscient. It is a logical impossibility for a trial 
court to determine in advance what illformation requested by 
the prosecution relates solely to an affirmative defense and 
what info11llation will not aid the prosecution in the prepara-
tion of its case against defendant. This is.so because innocence 
is the very antithesis of gvilt. Anything bearing upon one 
necessarily affects the other. It is the state's obligation to 
prove the guilt of defendant. It is defendant's choice to deter-
mine whether he will set up an "affirmative" defense to 
prove his innocence or simply deny guilt. But until the prose-
. cution has made out a prima facie case against him, he is not 
) 
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and should not bc compcUt'd toasslstthe prosecution either in 
its case in chief or iri rebuttal of h~spossible defense. 
It will not do to say that the impairment of constitutional 
rights is' only minor ill the .instant case,alld for that reason 
no one should get excited about it. The admonition given by 
the United States SuprcuieCoul't in Boydv . .united States, 
116 U.S. 616 [6 S.Ct.524, 29 L .. Ed.746J. is as sound today as 
it was 77 years ago. It was there stated (p~ 635) : . 
"It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and 
least repulsive form; but il~egitimate alid unconstitutional 
practices get their first footing in that way,namely, by silent 
approaches and slight ueviations from Jegalmodesof prOce-
dure. Thill can only be obviated<by adhering to the rule that 
constitutional provisions iorthe.security of person and prop- ': .. " 
erty should be libt'rnlly eonstrued..Aclose and literal con-
struction deprives them of .half tlleirefficacy, and leads to 
gradual depreciation of the 'risht,as if it consisted more in 
sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watch-
ful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any 
stealthy encroachments thereon." 
The majority rely on the alibi defense statutes found in 
several states, and upon two early Ohio cases, three intermedi-
ate New York appellate court cases, and a Wisconsin case 
upholding them. No federal case upholding such a statute 
is cited. The majority seem to reason that since Borne states 
by statute have compelled disclosure of the evidence in sup-
port of an alibi prior to' trial, California by judicial mandate 
should create a similar rule as to affirmative defenses gener-
ally. We are not told what the constitutional provisions are 
in such states, nor whether an alibi defense may not be 
different from other affirmative defenses. The short and com-
plete answer to this argument is, that if tIle Legislature tried 
by statute to adopt the rule announced by the majority, such 
statute would, in California, be unconstitutional. . 
Moreover, e,,'en if such a supposed statute would be consti- . 
tutional, th~ point need Hot be labored that that is no legal 
reason why this comt should legislate in tne matter. It is no 
argument to say that this eOllrt "legislated" in favor of the 
defendant, and therefore SIlO'uM "l<'gislate" in favor of the 
prosecution. As nlrt'ady pointed out, tlle holdings in reference 
to pretrial discovery hy def(~lldant were predi\~ated on concepts 
that were held to compel snch holdings in favor of defendants, 
but there are no such concepts that even suggest, far le!)s 
compel, such a conclusion in favor of the prosecution. Thus 
) 
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this court did not "legislate" in those cases. It is attempting 
to legislate now. I agree with what .Judge Pierce said in hi!'; 
concurring opinion when this case was before the District 
Court of Appeal (Ca1.App.) 17 Ca1.Rptr. 575, 578-579: "But 
the Legislature has not elected to tackle the ticklish problems 
of discovery in criminal cases directed against defendants and 
within that inconsiderable area bounded by the constitutional 
privilege against self-incrimination. ldo not find any inllerent 
judicial power to preempt this excursion into procedural reo 
form. I believe that if the innovation is to come it should be 
the product of the lawmakers, not of the courts. Therefore I 
would hold that, absent legislation, rio power exists in the 
trial court to command the defendant to produce the informa. 
tion here sought to be compelled." I add to that the thought 
that the assumption that the courts and not the Legislature are 
better equipped to determine policy in this field violates the 
separation of powers doctrine. The people, through their Cou-
stitution, have seen fit to confer this power on the Legislature 
and to deny it to the courts. 
The writ should issue prohibitiug all disclosure. 
DOOLING, J.-I dissent from the majority opinion insofar 
as it authorizes discovery against a defendant in a criminal 
case. Admittedly discovery in criminal cases in this state is 
court-created. Heretofore, as noted in the majority opinion, 
it has been limited to discovery by the defendant. Historically 
and by constitutional safeguards the right of defendants in 
criminal cases to be free of any procedure savoring of judicial 
inquisition has been jealously protected. As Justice Peters 
points out in his dissenting opinion, at least absent some legis-
lative provision such as those with regard to the defense of 
alibi referred to in the majority opinion,a defendant in a 
criminal case has never been compelled, in advance of the 
production of the prosecution's evidence against him, to deter· 
mine upon what if any defenses he may ultimately rely. The 
opinion 9f the majority in this case makes a breach, even if a 
comparatively small on£', in this right of this defendant and 
compels him now to commit himself to refmin from interpos-
ing the affirmative defense of impotency unless he make~ 
certain disclosures to the prosecution in advance of the trial. I 
am fearful, not so much of the step taken in this ease, as of 
its possible implications. It is purely .hy virtue of the acd-
dental fact that the defendant in this case asked for a con-
tinuance to procure evidence to support a claim of impotency 
J 
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that the prosc.;utiol1 was uware of the possibility that such a 
d<.>fellse might be inh'l'po,;ed. Xorll1ally the nature of his 
defenses woul<1not be disdosed by the defelluant in advance of 
trial. Are we laying down a rule in this case limited to similar 
cases, i.e., to cases in which for some reason the defendant 
in advance of trial chances to disclose in some manner his 
intention to rely upon some affirmative defense 1 If so the 
cases will be rare intleed in which the prosecution will be 
entitled to discovery. Or are we opening the door, as Justice 
Peters suggests, to a geueral inquiry by the prosecution 
whether the defendant intends to rely on any affirmative 
defense and if so what the llature of such affirmative uefense 
may be Y If the latter, alld this seems the logical conclusion 
from the majority's holding, by court-made rule we arc 
depriving the defendaut of the right which he heretofore 
always eujoYeLl of waiting until the close of the pros~cution 's 
case to determine the defense or defenses, if any, which he 
might then interpose. 
If the defendant's traditional freedom of action is thus to 
be curtailed, that curtailment seems to me to be preeminently 
a legislative and not a judieial function. The majority opinion 
cites no case from any jurisdiction in which any court has 
undertaken without statutory sanction to curtail this tradi-
tional right of a defendant, and I consider it unwise and 
dangerous for this court to enter upon such delicate ground. 
I have some doubt of the constitutional limitations on our 
judicial power to subject a def{'ndant in a criminal case to 
any form of discovery .• Justice Peters has elaborated the basis 
of that doubt. But putting constitutional questions aside I am 
fearful as a matter of policy of the future outcome of even so 
small an initial court-created inroad upon the heretofore 
unquestioned right of a defendant in a criminal case to remain 
silent, if he chooses, at every stage of the proceeding against 
him. 
Peters, J., concurred. 
~ 
Petitioner's appli!'ation for a rehearing was denied July 25, 
1962. Dooling, J.,. partidpatcd in pJace of Traynor, J. 
Peters, J., and Dooling, J.,. were of the opinion that the 
application should be granted. 
-Assigned by Chairman of JuuidaJ Council 
